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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WHO IS ACTUALLY CALLING THE SHOTS?
WATCH OUT, THEY MAY NOT BE LIABLE: IRVIN V. SMITH

I. INTRODUCTION
The medical field has undergone tremendous changes with the advent of
new medical technologies over the years.1 Today, a doctor can communicate
with both patients and colleagues across the country via telephones, e-mail,
cellular phones, and fax machines. Rural doctors, who were once limited to
their own expert knowledge or reference to medical handbooks, now can
quickly consult with specialized doctors who can help in patient evaluations.
With these increases in technology, however, traditional physician-patient
relationships are no longer easily defined.2 Since a physician-patient
relationship is a prerequisite for professional malpractice claims against
doctors, “courts face new challenges in drawing the line between non-liability
and a duty of care.”3
Some courts are reluctant to find a physician-patient relationship between a
patient and a consulting doctor who has been contacted by the treating
physician via telephone.4 In those cases, courts have found the consultation to
be merely “informal” because the consultant’s involvement with the patient
was only to answer a colleague’s inquiry.5 Many of these courts reason that
finding such a relationship would “stifle communication, education, and
professional association, all to the detriment of the patient.”6 Most courts
agree that while a formal consultation is required for a physician-patient
relationship, the consultation does not have to include direct patient contact.7

1. Sharon M. Glenn, Liability in the Absence of a Traditional Physician-Patient
Relationship: What Every “On Call” Doctor Should Know: Mozingo v. Pitt County Memorial
Hospital, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747 (1993).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes a Physician Patient Relationship
for Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R. 4th 132 § 9 (1982).
5. Id.
6. Reynolds v. Decatur Mem’l Hosp., 277 Ill.App.3d 80, 86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). See also
Lopez v. Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); Hill by Burston v. Kokosky, 186
Mich. App. 300, 306 (1990); Rainer v. Grossman, 31 Cal.App.3d 539, 543-44 (1973).
7. Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 270 Kan. 824, 835 (Kan. 2001); St. John v. Pope,
901 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. 1995); Lection v. Dyll, 65 S.W.3d 696, 704 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001);
185

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

186

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:185

Courts have analyzed the consultant’s level of involvement when considering
the existence of a formal consultation.8 Recently, the Kansas Supreme Court,
in Irvin v. Smith, refused to extend the physician-patient relationship between
a consulting physician and the patient despite the consultant’s high level of
involvement in the patient’s case.9 The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that a
formal consultation requires a personal examination of the patient.10
Part II of this note outlines the Irvin v. Smith case. Part III examines the
history of the physician-patient relationship. Part IV summarizes the Majority
and Dissenting Opinions in Irvin v. Smith. Finally, Part V analyzes the case’s
holding, dissent, and impact on the future of the physician-patient relationship.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Ashley Irvin was born with a condition known as hydrocephalus, which
causes a build up of cerebrospinal fluid in the skull.11 Left untreated, the
excess fluid would exert too much pressure on the brain and kill a
hydrocephalic.12 However, the surgical placement of a ventriculoperitoneal or
“VP” shunt will drain the excess fluid from the skull into the abdomen where it
is reabsorbed into the body.13
At age two, Ashley had a “VP” shunt surgically placed by Dr. Edwin
MacGee, a neurosurgeon.14 As long as the “VP” shunt worked properly,
Ashley was able to live a normal life.15 However, twice in her early childhood,
Ashley had to undergo surgery to keep the shunt working properly.16
On October 15, 1995, twelve-year-old Ashley was taken to Bob Wilson
Memorial Hospital in Ulysses, Kansas after experiencing a number of
symptoms, including neck and back pain, nausea, and seizures.17 Three days
later, Ashley was then transported by life flight to St. Luke’s Hospital in
Kansas City, Missouri for an examination by Dr. MacGee to determine if
Ashley’s shunt was working properly.18 X-rays were taken of Ashley’s chest
and abdomen, which were examined by an unidentified radiologist and Dr.
Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 305 (citing Dougherty v. Gifford 826 S.W.2d 668, 674-75 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992)).
8. James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes a Physician Patient Relationship
for Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R. 4th 132 § 9 (1982).
9. Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934 (Kan. 2001).
10. Irvin, 31 P.3d at 942.
11. Id. at 938.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Karen Divelbliss.19 The radiologist told Dr. MacGee that two inches of the
shunt tubing remained in the abdomen.20 Additionally, Dr. Divelbliss’s official
reading of the x-ray showed nothing wrong with the shunt.21 Therefore,
Ashley was sent home on October 21, and Dr. MacGee informed Ashley’s
pediatrician, Dr. Michael Shull, in Garden City, Kansas that the shunt appeared
to be working properly.22
On November 12, Ashley again began experiencing neck and back pain,
nausea, and seizures.23 She was admitted to St. Catherine’s Hospital in Garden
City, Kansas.24 Dr. Shull examined Ashley and ordered x-rays to be taken of
Ashley’s chest and abdomen to again rule out a shunt malfunction.25 The
radiologist at St. Catherine’s examined the x-rays and reported that there was
no malfunction.26 Although the radiologist reported that no abnormalities were
present in the x-rays, Dr. Shull was still worried about a possible shunt
malfunction.27 Therefore, Dr. Shull ordered an MRI of Ashley’s brain to check
for increased intracranial pressure.28 The MRI, however, was negative.29
On November 13, Dr. Shull consulted Dr. MacGee regarding Ashley’s
symptoms.30 Dr. MacGee expressed his opinion that the shunt was working
properly and instructed Dr. Shull to prescribe hydration and seizure control
medication to help alleviate her symptoms.31 Yet, Ashley continued to
experience the symptoms despite the medication.32 Dr. Shull contacted Dr.
Smith, a pediatric intensivist at Wesley Medical Center in Witchita, Kansas.33
Dr. Shull informed Dr. Smith of Ashley’s condition, her present symptoms,
and the possibility of a shunt malfunction.34 On November 14, with Dr.
Smith’s approval, Dr. Shull ordered Ashley’s transfer from St. Catherine’s

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. At trial, the x-rays taken at St. Luke’s showed the shunt tubing was pulled up into the
abdomen wall which intermittently blocked the flow of cranial fluid into the abdominal cavity.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 938.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Hospital to Wesley Medical Center in Witchita, Kansas and ordered additional
x-rays to be sent with Ashley to Wesley Medical Center.35
Dr. Smith admitted Ashley at Wesley Medical Center with the x-rays, but
at trial, he testified that he could not recall whether he looked at the x-rays or
not.36 The x-rays showed Ashley’s shunt required repair because the “tip” of
the shunt was embedded in her abdomen wall.37 Dr. Smith did admit at trial
that he would have known the shunt required repair had he looked at the xrays, but was under the belief that a radiologist at Garden City had already
examined the x-rays and found no repair necessary.38 However, no radiologist
at Garden City had read the additional x-rays that were sent with Ashley.39
On November 14, Dr. Smith called Dr. Gilmartin on the telephone to
obtain a “neurological consult.”40 Dr. Smith believed Dr. Gilmartin, a child
neurologist, would be “the best consultant to use to help evaluate Ashley.”41
Dr. Smith discussed Ashley’s condition and symptoms with Dr. Gilmartin, and
both agreed a shuntogram, a procedure that “involves the injection of a
radioactive isotope into the shunt to check for shunt blockage”, and an EEG
should be ordered.42 Dr. Smith and Dr. Gilmartin both agreed that Ashley’s
symptoms did not require an immediate shuntogram because Ashley appeared
stable, alert and conscious between seizures.43 Therefore, Dr. Smith and Dr.
Gilmartin planned to do the shuntogram the following morning, November
15.44
On the morning of November 15, Ashley’s condition was stable; she was
alert, awake, and verbal.45 However at 8:45 a.m., before the shuntogram or
EEG were performed, Ashley’s condition deteriorated requiring resuscitation
and intubation.46 Then, over two hours later, at 11:30 a.m., Ashley’s pupils
became dilated and unresponsive to light.47 Finally, the shuntogram was
performed revealing the tip of the shunt was embedded in the abdomen wall.48
Surgery was then performed to correct the shunt malfunction.49 However, it
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 938-39.
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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was too late for Ashley. Ashley had already suffered an ischemic brain injury
due to the lack of oxygen to her brain before the shuntogram procedure was
performed.50 Ashley’s permanent and severe brain damage keeps her from
walking, speaking, or carrying out any daily functions.51 She has to be fed
through a tube and requires full-time care.52
Ashley and her parents (together “Irvin”) filed an action in Sedgwick
County District Court against Dr. MacGee, Neurology/Neurosurgery P.C., Dr.
Smith, Dr. Gilmartin, and Wesley Medical Center.53 Irvin later added St.
Luke’s Radiological Group, Dr. Divelbliss, and Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corporation.54 Irvin settled with Dr. MacGee and Neurology/Nuerosurgery
P.C.55 Dr. Divelbliss was granted a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, and Irvin voluntarily dismissed her claim against Dr. Divelbliss’s
employer, St. Luke’s Radiological Group.56 The district court accepted Dr.
Gilmartin’s argument that he owed no duty to Ashley since a physician-patient
relationship was not established, and therefore, the court granted his motion for
summary judgment.57
In March 1999, Irvin’s first case was tried before a jury in Sedgwick
County against Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, Dr. Smith, and
Wesley Medical Center.58 The trial resulted in a directed verdict in favor of
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation and a hung jury for Dr. Smith and
Wesley Medical Center.59 After the trial, Irvin settled her claims against
Wesley Medical Center.60
In November 1999, Irvin’s second jury trial against St. Luke’s and Dr.
Divelbliss resulted in a verdict of $1,770,391.08.61 However, Irvin sought the
same damages as those claimed in the Sedgwick County action and therefore,
filed a motion for additur or in the alternative a motion for a new trial.62 The
district court granted the motion for the new trial and vacated the verdict.63

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Irvin later filed a claim against both defendants in Jackson County, Missouri. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Irvin subsequently settled with St. Luke’s and Dr. Divelbliss for the full
amount of the verdict.64
In January 2000, Irvin’s third jury trial against Dr. Smith in Sedgwick
County resulted in a verdict of no fault on the part of Dr. Smith.65 Irvin’s
motion for a new trial was denied.66 Irvin then appealed this verdict and the
dismissal of Dr. Gilmartin.67 Dr. Smith also filed a cross-appeal.68 The
Kansas Supreme Court found the district court did not err in refusing to grant
Irvin’s motion for a new trial.69 Further, while affirming the district court’s
decisions, the Kansas Supreme Court noted Smith’s cross-appeals were moot.70
The Kansas Supreme Court also rejected Irvin’s argument that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gilmartin.71 The
Kansas Supreme Court agreed with the district court’s finding that no
physician-patient relationship existed between Gilmartin and Irvin.72 Without
a physician-patient relationship, Dr. Gilmartin owed no duty to Irvin, one of
the basic elements of a medical malpractice case.73 The Kansas Supreme
Court noted that finding a physician-patient relationship between Dr. Gilmartin
and Irvin would discourage telephone consultations, which is against the
public’s interest since these calls are used on a frequent basis in the medical
field.74
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Nearly a century and a half ago, courts recognized negligence in the
medical field as a separate tort.75 Prior to this recognition, medical malpractice
was solely a contract action.76 Today medical malpractice is a “civil action for
damages resulting from the negligence of a physician in treating a patient.”77

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 940.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 947.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 942-43.
72. Id. at 940, 943.
73. Id. at 940.
74. Id. at 943.
75. Sharon M. Glenn, Liability in the Absence of
Relationship: What Every “On Call” Doctor Should Know:
Hospital, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747, 752 (1993).
76. Sharon M. Glenn, Liability in the Absence of
Relationship: What Every “On Call” Doctor Should Know:
Hospital, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747, 752 (1993).
77. Id.

a Traditional Physician-Patient
Mozingo v. Pitt County Memorial
a Traditional Physician-Patient
Mozingo v. Pitt County Memorial
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The elements of a medical malpractice claim are: 1) a duty, 2) a breach of the
duty, 3) causation, and 4) damages.78 In order to establish the element of duty,
one must prove the existence of a physician-patient relationship.79 Absent
such a relationship, a physician cannot be held liable for medical malpractice.80
The existence of a physician-patient relationship requires mutual
knowledge and consent.81 In St. John v. Pope, the Texas Supreme Court
provided a good description of the circumstances under which a duty arises in
medical malpractice.82 The court distinguished the duty under ordinary
negligence from the duty required for a claim in medical malpractice.83 Under
a general negligence theory, people have a duty to refrain from negligently
injuring others even though no prior relationship exists.84 However, physicians
do not owe a duty to “exercise their particular talents, knowledge, and skill on
behalf of every person they encounter in the course of the day.”85
Additionally, the court noted that physicians are not even required to render
their services to everyone who asks for care.86 Furthermore, the duty only
exists when a physician consents to a physician-patient relationship, though
this consent may be express or implied.87 Since consent may be implied, a
physician does not need to directly deal with a patient for a duty to exist.88
Additionally, the “physician-patient relationship does not require the
formalities of a contract.”89
An increasing number of courts have found physician-patient relationships
even when the physician has had no personal contact with the patient.90 These
courts have noted that indirect contact with a patient will not preclude a
physician-patient relationship.91 Therefore, some courts are now willing to
impose liability on consulting doctors.92 However, the consulting doctor’s
78. Id.
79. Id. at 752-53.
80. Id. at 753.
81. St. John, 901 S.W.2d at 423; Adams, 270 Kan. at 835; Reynolds, 277 Ill.App.3d at 85;
Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 306.
82. St. John, 901 S.W.2d at 420.
83. Id. at 423.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 424.
89. Id.
90. Cogswell v. Chapman, 249 A.D.2d 865, 866-67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Adams, 270
Kan. at 836-37; Lection, 65 S.W.3d at 715.
91. Adams, 270 Kan. At 835; Lection, 65 S.W.3d at 704; St. John, 901 W.E.2d at 424;
Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 305; Dougherty, 826 S.W.2d at 674-75; Cogswell, 249 A.D.2d at 866-67.
92. Adams, 270 Kan. At 837; Lection, 65 S.W.3d at 715; Dougherty, 826 S.W.2d at 672,
674.
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level of involvement in the patient’s case often determines whether a duty is
created.93
In Oliver v. Brock, the consultant’s level of involvement was not enough
for a physician-patient relationship to be created.94 The Alabama Supreme
Court found the consulting physician did not take any part in the treatment of
the patient.95 The physician had never seen the patient and never requested to
serve as a consultant in the patient’s treatment.96 The attending physician had
generally described Oliver’s injuries and treatment during a telephone
conversation which was originated to discuss another patient’s treatment.97
The consulting doctor did not offer any treatment advice, but merely agreed
with the treating doctor’s opinion.98 The court found the conversation to be
merely gratuitous and affirmed summary judgment in the physician’s favor.99
However, almost twenty-five years after the Oliver decision, the Arizona
Court of Appeals, in Diggs v. Arizona Cardiologists, Ltd., held that a
cardiologist had a duty of care to the patient when the cardiologist offered an
“informal consult.”100 In Diggs, the cardiologist consulted with an emergency
room physician regarding a patient with severe chest pains.101 After the
consultation, the emergency room physician released the patient, who then
died of a heart attack three hours later.102 The court noted that generally a
physician who provides an informal consult does not have a duty of care to the
patient.103 However, in this case, the court found the cardiologist voluntarily
undertook a duty of care to the patient because the cardiologist’s opinion, his
interpretation of the electrocardiogram (EKG), was the primary factor that led
the ER doctor to rule out a myocardial infarction.104 Further, the court relied
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A and found that the
consulting doctor undertook to give treatment advice to the attending doctor
knowing that he would rely on this advice.105 Therefore, the court found that,

93. Adams, 270 Kan. At 837; Lection, 65 S.W.3d at 714-15; Cogswell, 249 A.D.2d at 86667.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Oliver v. Brock, 342 So.2d 1 (Ala 1976).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Diggs, 198 Ariz. at 198.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 202.
Id.
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even though no contractual patient-physician relationship existed between the
cardiologist and the patient, the cardiologist owed a duty of reasonable care.106
Typically, as the Diggs court noted, no physician-patient relationship exists
between the patient and the consultant if the consultant informally offers his or
her opinion to another physician.107 In Hill v. Kokosky, the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that a physician-patient relationship did not exist between the
patient and the consulting physician.108 In Hill, the treating physician
discussed the patient’s pregnancy difficulties in numerous telephone
conversations with a consulting physician.109 The consulting doctor gave his
opinion based on the patient’s case history as related to him by the treating
physician.110 However, the consulting physician did not see the patient,
examine her, or view her chart.111 The court stated that the physician’s
opinions were “not in the nature of prescribed course of treatment” but were
“recommendations to be accepted or rejected” by the treating physician.112
The court compared the medical advice offered by the consultant to
information one might find in a medical treatise or article.113 Therefore, the
court found no physician-patient relationship existed because the consulting
doctor had such a limited and remote connection with the patient’s case.114
In NBD Bank v. Barry, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that no
evidence supported a physician-patient relationship between the patient and
consulting physician.115 In NBD Bank, the treating physician contacted the
consulting doctor on multiple occasions to seek his opinion regarding
treatment alternatives for the patient.116 However, the consulting doctor did
not agree to treat the patient or to be a consultant on the case.117 Further, the
court found the treating doctor was free to accept or reject the consulting
doctor’s recommendations, and therefore, the consulting physician owed no
duty of care to the patient.118
In Reynolds v. Decatur Memorial Hosp., the Illinois Appellate Court held
no physician-patient relationship existed between the patient and a doctor who

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 203.
Id.
Hill by Burston, 186 Mich. App. at 300.
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 305-306.
NBD Bank v. Barry, 223 Mich. App. 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 370.
Id. at 373
Id.
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gave an informal opinion over the telephone.119 The court noted the doctor
merely answered an inquiry from a colleague, was not contacted again, and
charged no fee.120 The court stated the consultant was not asked to provide a
service for the patient, conduct lab tests, review test results, or commit himself
to further involvement with the patient.121 Therefore, the Illinois Appellate
Court reasoned that finding a physician-patient relationship under the
circumstances in the case would have “a chilling effect upon the practice of
medicine.
It would stifle communication, education and professional
association, all to the detriment of the patient.”122
Similarly in Corbet v. McKinney, the physician’s consultation with the
patient’s treating doctor was insufficient to establish the requisite relationship
and duty of care.123 The Missouri Court of Appeals noted that the consulting
physician merely offered a recommendation for treatment.124 The court stated
that merely undertaking to advise the patient’s treating doctor as to general
patient care is not enough for a physician-patient relationship.125 Instead, the
court noted that undertaking to examine, diagnose, or treat the patient will give
rise to a relationship.126 However, the court found no evidence that the
physician contracted to provide medical services, examined the patient, or
diagnosed the patient.127
In Ingber v. Kandler, the New York Appellate Court, held that the
consulting physician gave an informal opinion to a fellow physician, and
therefore no physician-patient relationship existed.128 The court noted that the
consulting physician did not have any contact with the patient, never saw any
records relating the case, and did not even know the patient’s name.129
The Texas Court of Appeals, in Lopez v. Aziz, also found no physicianpatient relationship to exist between the patient and an OB-GYN specialist
consulted by phone by the patient’s treating physician.130 The consultant did
not bill the patient or treating physician, did not prepare any reports or conduct
any lab tests, did not accept any work relating to the patient’s case, and never
contacted or examined the patient.131 The treating doctor acknowledged that
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Reynolds, 277 Ill.App.3d at 80.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id. at 86.
Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 168-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 171.
Id. at 169-70.
Id. at 169.
Id.at 171.
Ingber v. Kandler, 128 A.D.2d 591, 591-92 (N.Y. 1987).
Id. at 592.
Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 304.
Id. at 306.
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he was ultimately responsible for the patient’s treatment and was free to accept
or reject the consultant’s opinion.132 Further, the court noted the consultant’s
comments were not binding, and he had no authority or control of the course of
the patient’s treatment.133 The court found the consulting physician merely
answered a professional inquiry of a colleague.134
Although most courts have found that an informal consultation does not
give rise to a physician-patient relationship, courts have struggled with the
complex question of when a consultant’s opinion becomes formal. Many
courts find informal consults when the physician has not committed to further
involvement with patient, charged the patient or the treating doctor, or retained
control of the patient’s treatment.135 Often formal consults involve a physician
attempting to evaluate, diagnose, or treat a patient.136
In Cogswell v. Chapman, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the
ophthalmologist, who served as a courtesy/consulting physician at a hospital,
entered into a physician-patient relationship with the infant patient.137 In
Cogswell, a physician’s assistant called the consulting ophthalmologist on the
telephone for advice regarding the infant patient.138 After asking the
physician’s assistant a series of questions, the ophthalmologist advised him of
treatment management, including rest, Tylenol, and the possible need of
follow-up visits.139 The physician assistant relayed this information to the ER
doctor who followed the ophthalmologist’s advice.140
The court held that the ophthalmologist had more than an informal interest
in the patient’s condition, and an issue of fact existed as to the level of
involvement the ophthalmologist had in the patient’s treatment.141 The court
noted that physical contact with the patient is not a requirement for a
physician-patient relationship.142 The court also stated that if a physician
advises a patient over the telephone, and it is foreseeable that the patient would

132. Id. at 307.
133. Id. at 307
134. Id.
135. Reynolds, 277 Ill. App.3d at 83, 87; Hill by Burston, 186 Mich. App. At 304, 306; St.
John, 901 S.W.2d at 424; Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 306-307; Cogswell, 249 A.D. at 866-67; Bovara
v. St. Francis Hosp., 700 N.E.2d 143, 148-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting
Mem’l Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32, 38-40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
136. Lection, 65 S.W.3d at 715.
137. Cogswell, 249 A.D.2d at 865-67.
138. Id. at 865.
139. Id. at 865-66.
140. Id. at 865.
141. Id. at 867.
142. Id. at 866.
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rely on that advice, an implied physician-patient relationship can exist.143
Here, the ophthalmologist may have offered advice that would likely be
followed since he had particular expertise in the field, and the ER doctor did
not.144
In Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Memorial Hospital, the court found that a
physician-patient relationship was created when an on-call physician received
information through a nurse’s phone call from the hospital regarding the status
of a woman in labor.145 The on-call physician used this relayed information to
conclude that the patient should be transferred to a hospital over ninety miles
away.146 The patient began delivering the baby in breech before reaching the
hospital and died due to suffocation.147 According to the court, the on-call
physician established a physician-patient relationship with the patient because
he evaluated the status of the patient’s labor and gave the approval for the
patient’s transfer.148 Even though the doctor had no contact or connection with
the patient other than one phone call from the nurse, the court relied on the fact
that the doctor rendered his services to the patient and concluded he had a duty
of care.149
In Lection v. Dyll, the Texas Court of Appeals held the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the physician.150 The court found
genuine issues of fact existed as to whether a physician-patient relationship
existed.151 In Lection, the on-call neurologist spoke with the hospital
emergency room physician over the telephone.152 The consulting neurologist
diagnosed the emergency room patient’s condition over the phone and told the
ER doctor that no other treatment was necessary and the patient could leave the
hospital.153 The court found that the consulting doctor stated his medical
opinion as to the treatment of the patient and the ER doctor relied on the
consultant’s expertise and advice.154 Therefore, summary judgment was
precluded.155
In Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., the Kansas Supreme Court found
a physician-patient relationship existed between the physician and patient
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. at 867.
Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Mem’l Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App. 1993).
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Id. at 39-40.
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although the physician did not speak directly with the patient, had not seen,
talked to, or treated the patient in four years.156 In Adams, the patient’s mother
contacted the family physician to seek advice about her pregnant daughter’s
abdominal pain.157 The physician advised the mother to take her daughter to
the emergency room if the pain worsened, and to see a doctor the next day.158
The court found that the doctor’s “undertaking to render medical advice as to
the patient’s condition gave rise to a physician-patient relationship.”159 The
court reasoned that it was immaterial that the physician had not seen the patient
for several years, did not speak directly with the patient, or that he no longer
provided obstetrical care.160 The fact that the physician gave the mother his
medical opinion over the phone gave rise to a physician-patient relationship.161
The court further noted that even if the prior relationship between the daughter
and physician had extinguished since the physician had not seen her for four
years, the medical advice given to her mother had renewed a relationship.162
The court distinguished this case from others because the doctor took some
action to give medical assistance.163
In Bovara v. St. Francis Hosp., the Illinois Appellate Court held that
genuine issues of fact existed as to whether a physician-patient relationship
existed.164 In Bovara, the court noted that a physician who provides a service
for a patient may have a duty to the patient.165 In Bovara, the consulting
physicians reviewed angiogram film and communicated to the cardiologist that
the recipient was a candidate for coronary angioplasty.166 The patient died
during the procedure.167 The court held the consulting physicians may have
established a physician-patient relationship with the patient since they provided
a service for the patient and should have known their medical opinion would
be passed on to the patient.168
Other courts have adopted clear-cut tests to determine when a consulting
doctor may have a duty to the patient. These cases often involve on-call
doctors who have not physically examined a patient. In Millard v. Corrado,
156. Adams, 270 Kan. at 836-37.
157. Id. at 826.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 837.
160. Id. at 836.
161. Id. at 837.
162. Id.
163. The doctor told her the daughter was experiencing nothing unusual and dissuaded the
mother from promptly seeking medical attention. Id.
164. Bovara v. St. Francis Hosp., 700 N.E.2d 143, 149 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
165. Id. at 147.
166. Id. at 145.
167. Id. at 146.
168. Id. at 147-48.
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the Missouri Appellate Court held a physician-patient relationship can arise if
the physician is contractually obligated to provide assistance in the patient’s
diagnosis and treatment and does so.169 In an Ohio Appellate Court case,
McKinney v. Schlatter, the court held “that a physician-patient relationship can
exist by implication between an emergency room patient and an on call
physician who is consulted by the patient’s physician but who has never met,
spoken with, or consulted the patient when the on call physician (1)
participates in the diagnosis of the patient’s condition, (2) participates in or
prescribes a course of treatment for the patient, and (3) owes a duty to the
hospital, staff or patient for whose benefit he is on call.”170 The Michigan
Appellate Court recently adopted the McKinney test in Oja v. Kin.171
Although the Millard and McKinney courts provided well-defined tests to
determine when a physician-patient relationship exists, these tests apply only
to physicians with contractual obligations. Numerous state courts have begun
to set forth criteria to enable one to distinguish between informal and formal
consults, but a fuzzy line still exists between non-liability and a duty of care in
may states. In Irvin v. Smith the Kansas Supreme Court drew a solid line
between non-liability and a duty of care, but in doing so nearly erased the
consulting doctor’s duty of care.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A.

Majority Opinion

In Irvin v. Smith, the Kansas Supreme Court asserted that one element of a
medical malpractice claim is a duty of care, which exists only if a physicianpatient relationship is found.172 The court noted that the existence of a
physician-patient relationship is a question often left to a jury.173 However, the
court added that summary judgment may be proper if a jury could draw only
one conclusion from the undisputed facts that no physician-patient relationship
exists.174
Once the court established that summary judgment could be proper, the
court discussed the circumstances in which it and other courts have found such
relationships to exist.175 First, the court cited the Missouri Court of Appeals by
stating the relationship is generally created only where the physician
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175.

Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42, 50-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
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personally examines the patient.176 However, the court cited a number of
cases, including one of its previous decisions, in which courts have found a
physician-patient relationship even though the physician did not examine the
patient but instead had merely indirect contact with the patient.177 Yet, the
court noted that a physician-patient relationship is not created when a
physician gives merely an “informal opinion” to the treating physician.178
The court cited its 2001 decision in Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr.
regarding the “foundational requirements for the existence of a physicianpatient relationship.”179 The court stated:
A physician-patient relationship is consensual. Thus, where there is no
ongoing physician-patient relationship, the physician’s express or implied
consent to advise or treat the patient is required for the relationship to come
into being. Stated otherwise, the doctor must take some affirmative action
with regard to treatment of a patient in order for the relationship to be
established.180

After examining case history, the court analyzed Irvin’s argument.181 Irvin
argued the facts show that Dr. Smith and Dr. Gilmartin engaged in a lengthy,
detailed conversation about the condition, care, and treatment of Irvin.182 This
conversation provided Dr. Gilmartin with a “complete picture of Ashley Irvin’s
presentation,” and Dr. Gilmartin testified that he believed Irvin’s condition was
stable.183 Dr. Gilmartin further testified that he “jointly developed a plan for
the evaluation of Ashley Irvin” and assumed primary responsibility for
performing the shuntogram on November 15, 1995.184 The Kansas Court
noted certain facts it deemed important including: 1) Dr. Gilmartin was not an
employee of the hospital; 2) Dr. Gilmartin was not on call the night he received
a phone call from Dr. Smith; 3) Dr. Gilmartin never had involvement or
contact with Ashley Irvin or her family prior to the November 14th call from
Dr. Smith; and 4) Dr. Gilmartin had no contractual obligation to attend any
patients at Wesley.185
The court decided that Dr. Gilmartin had merely been asked to carry out a
consultation on November 15, 1995.186 Further, the court stated that this

176.
177.
178.
179.
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181.
182.
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consultation on the 15th would be a “formal consultation” because it included
a full bedside review and physical examination of the patient.187 The court
stated that Dr. Gilmartin had not spoken with Irvin or her parents, reviewed her
hospital chart, nor examined Irvin on the 14th.188 The court additionally
placed great emphasis on the facts that Dr. Gilmartin was informed of Irvin’s
condition only by his conversation with Dr. Smith, that Dr. Gilmartin did not
enter any orders in Irvin’s case, and that he took no other action than
discussing the case with Dr. Smith in general terms.189 Finally the court
reasoned that telephone conversations like that between Smith and Gilmartin
take place frequently in the medical field.190 Therefore, discouraging such
conversations, by creating a relationship between the physician and the patient,
would be adverse to the both the patients’ and public’s interests.191
The court additionally cited numerous cases which have rejected the
extension of a duty to physicians who provide informal consultations.192 The
court cited the Illinois Appellate court which stated that finding a physicianpatient relationship in every conversation would “have a chilling effect upon
the practice of medicine. It would stifle communication, education and
professional association, all to the detriment of the patient.”193
The Kansas Supreme Court analyzed a Michigan Appellate Court case,
NBD Bank v. Barry, in which the court held a physician-patient relationship
did not exist because the physician did not formally consult on the case.194 The
court stated that the physician offered merely informal recommendations
which the treating physician ‘“was free to accept or reject.”‘195 In NBD, the
consultant did not contact or examine the patient and reviewed the patient’s
chart only once.196
The Kansas Supreme Court noted that an Illinois Appellate Court case,
Reynolds v. Decatur Memorial Hosp., was similar to Irvin’s case and yet, the
appellate court held there was no physician-patient relationship.197 In
Reynolds, a pediatrician, Dr. Bonds, called Dr. Fulbright regarding a child
patient with a high fever. Dr. Fulbright inquired whether the child had a stiff
neck, and after Dr. Bonds reporting that the child did, Dr. Fulbright
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recommended a spinal tap be performed.198 From the procedure the patient
had incurred a spinal cord injury, which left him permanently quadriplegic.199
The appellate court decided Dr. Fulbright’s consultation was informal, and
therefore no physician-patient relationship was created.200
Therefore, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that Dr. Gilmartin did not
have a physician-patient relationship with Irvin and that summary judgment
was correctly granted in Gilmartin’s favor.201
B.

Dissenting Opinion

Judge Lockett dissented from the majority’s opinion, contending the
majority did not
distinguish between the various types of physician consultants and instead
excluded them all for public policy reasons.202 Judge Lockett disagreed with
the majority’s statement that a formal consultation requires (1) a full bedside
review of the case and (2) a physical examination of the patient.203 Lockett
noted that the majority cited Millard v. Corrado for the proposition that
“generally a physician-patient relationship requires a physician personally
examining a patient,” but then acknowledged a contrary statement in Adams, a
2001 Kansas Supreme Court case, to the effect that indirect contract doesn’t
preclude a physician-patient relationship.204 Lockett criticized the majority for
ignoring this prior Kansas case law and basing its decision on public policy.205
Lockett argued that the majority failed to note the difference between an
informal opinion and a formal opinion.206 Lockett asserted that a distinction
should be made between consulting doctors who merely offer suggestions to a
treating physician and those who aid the treating physician in formulating a
Lockett found Irvin’s argument
treatment plan for the patient.207
convincing.208 Irvin asserted that Dr. Gilmartin developed a plan for the
evaluation of Irvin jointly with the treating physician, Dr. Smith, and Dr.
Gilmartin agreed to assume primary responsibility for performing the
shuntogram.209 Further, Irvin argued that Dr. Gilmartin engaged in a very
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detailed conversation regarding the condition, care, and treatment of Irvin
which gave Dr. Gilmartin a complete picture of Irvin’s presentation.210
Therefore, Irvin argued this was not an informal consultation, but rather, a
formal consultation which gave rise to a physician-patient relationship between
Irvin and Dr. Gilmartin.211
Lockett next examined the case law which the majority relied on in its
opinion. Lockett disagreed with the majority’s analysis of Reynolds.212 In
Reynolds, the examining physician telephoned a second physician at home to
seek advice in diagnosing a child.213 The only participation by the second
physician in the treatment of the child was his suggestion that a particular test
be conducted to rule out the child’s illness.214 The Illinois court held that this
was merely an “informal opinion” and the second physician was just answering
an inquiry from a colleague.215 Therefore, no physician-patient relationship
existed.216
Lockett did not agree that these facts were “strikingly similar” to Irvin’s
case like the majority found.217 Instead, Lockett noted that the facts in Bovara
v. St. Francis Hosp. were similar to Irvin’s case.218 In Bovara, the two
consulting doctors reviewed an angiogram film and communicated to the
cardiologist that the patient was a candidate for a coronary angioplasty.219 In
Bovara the Illinois court limited its prior holding in Reynolds by stating that a
physician-patient relationship may exist if the physician performs a service for
the care and treatment of a patient.220 Further, the court decided a trier of fact
may find that the doctors knew or should have known their medical opinion
would be passed on to the patient and would be crucial to whether or not the
angioplasty was performed.221
The majority also relied on NBD Bank v. Barry in which the Michigan
court found no physician-patient relationship because the consultations were
merely informal.222 However, Lockett noted that the consulting physician in
NBD Bank did not agree to treat the patient or to be a consultant on the case.223
210.
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Additionally, the attending physician was free to accept or reject the consulting
doctors advice.224 Lockett distinguished NBD from Irvin because Dr.
Gilmartin knew his advice would directly affect Dr. Smith’s course of
treatment of Irvin.225 Additionally, Lockett noted that Dr. Gilmartin agreed to
personally perform the shutogram.226 Further, Dr. Gilmartin performed the
shutogram the following day which had a significant impact on Irvin’s
injury.227
Lockett found Diggs v. Arizona Cardiologists, Ltd., to be more
persuasive.228 In Diggs, the emergency room physician consulted the
cardiologist regarding a patient with severe chest pain.229 The patient was then
released and died of a heart attack three hours later.230 The Arizona court
found that the cardiologist was in the best position to rule out a myocardial
infarction based on the echocardiogram because of his knowledge and
expertise, and therefore owed a duty of care to the patient.231
Lockett further noted that the Arizona court relied on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 324A, which states: “One who undertakes,
gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should
recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting form his
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking if (a) his failure to
exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or . . . (c) the harm is
suffered because of reliance of the other or third person upon the
undertaking.”232
The Arizona court found that the consulting doctor undertook to provide
his expertise to the treating physician, knowing that it was necessary for the
protection of the patient and that the treating physician would rely on it.233 The
treating physician did not exercise an independent judgment to the patient’s
diagnosis because he subordinated his professional judgment to that of the
specialist.234 Therefore, the court held the consultant became the provider of
medical treatment which gave rise to a duty of reasonable care.235
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Finally, Lockett argued that the majority should not have characterized Dr.
Gilmartin’s involvement as an informal consultation.236 Dr. Gilmartin and Dr.
Smith both decided to perform the shuntogram the following day, which
caused Irvin’s injuries.237 Further, Lockett stated that Dr. Gilmartin’s
experience and expertise factored into the decision to delay the treatment.238
Therefore, Lockett stated that the district court’s grant of summary judgment
should be reversed and the facts should be submitted to the jury to determine
whether a physician-patient relationship existed.239
V. COMMENT
In recent years, courts have been finding ways to redefine the doctorpatient relationship to allow plaintiffs greater access to claims against
physicians.240 In Diggs v. Arizona Cardiologists, Ltd., the Arizona court used
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A to extend a duty of care to the
consulting patient.241 In Millard v. Corrado, the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Eastern District of Missouri provided two avenues of recovery: (1) a
traditional medical malpractice claim, even though the physician had no
contact with the patient, and (2) a claim for general negligence based on public
policy and the foreseeability of harm.242 In Tenuto v. Lederle Laboratories, the
New York Court of Appeals held that a pediatrician owed parents a duty of
care, based on common-law principles of ordinary negligence and malpractice,
to warn them of their personal health risks from vaccination.243
The recent holding by the Kansas Supreme Court in Irving v. Smith does
not follow this trend in the case law across the country. In Irving, the court
limited a physician’s potential liability by limiting physician-patient
relationships to those cases where a consulting doctor performs a full bedside
review of the case, including a physical examination of the patient.244
Although many courts have found physician-patient relationships only in cases
where “formal” consultations occurred, these courts have not held such a
narrow definition of “formal.”
Some courts have held that formal
consultations arise when a physician attempts to evaluate, diagnose, or treat a
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237. Id. at 951-52.
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240. Jane Drummond, Could Somebody Call a Doctor? On-Call Physicians and the Duty to
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241. Diggs, 198 Ariz. at 202-203.
242. Drummond, supra note 240, at 1055 (citing Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999).
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patient. Additionally, courts find formal consultations when a doctor offers
treatment advice that is likely to be accepted by the attending physician
because of the consultant’s superior expert knowledge in a particular field.
Other courts have found physician-patient relationships if the consulting doctor
provided a service to the patient.
Courts have invariably held that informal consultations do not give rise to
physician-patient relationships. In these cases, the physician often is just
answering a colleague’s inquiry which can be accepted or rejected. The
consulting physician does not agree to and does not actually diagnose or treat
the patient. Often, the consultant is not paid and does not even know the
patient’s name. Further, the consulting physician has not retained control over
the patient’s course of treatment. Therefore, the physician’s low-level of
involvement does not give rise to a duty of care.245
In Irvin v. Smith, the majority ignored previous case law that had begun to
draw the line between informal and formal consultations.246 Instead, the court
offered a new definition: that a formal consultation must include a physical
examination.247 Therefore, the majority diverged from prior case law which
stated that direct physical contact is not always necessary in finding a
physician-patient relationship.248 Judge Lockett, in his dissent, noted that the
majority’s decision rested entirely on the public policy, that dissuading such
consultations would be against the public’s interest.249
Extending a physician-patient relationship to every telephone consultation
between doctors would clearly be harmful to the public because it would limit
doctors’ freedom to make informal inquiries to their colleagues. However,
holding a physician to a duty of care only when he or she engages in a physical
examination of a patient is also harmful to the public’s interest. When a
physician engages in consultations that directly influence the treatment a
patient will receive, the physician must be held to a certain standard of care.
To avoid extending duties to physicians who answer mere inquiries, courts
must clearly draw a distinction between formal and informal consultations.
Judge Lockett’s dissent analyzed the case with the prior definitions of
informal and formal consultations in mind.250 Lockett recognized that Dr.
Gilmartin did more than just answer a mere inquiry from Dr. Smith.251
245. However, in Diggs v. Arizona, the court noted that informal consultations do not often
give rise to physician-patient relationships, but held that the consultant had a duty of care since he
had expert knowledge in the area of consultation. Diggs, 198 Ariz. at 203.
246. Irvin, 31 P.3d at 941-43.
247. Id. at 942.
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Instead, Dr. Gilmartin engaged in a lengthy conversation with Dr. Smith about
the treatment Irving would receive.252 Dr. Gilmartin further agreed to perform
the shuntogram the following day.253 Additionally, Dr. Gilmartin was a
specialist who was contacted by Dr. Smith for his superior knowledge in this
field.254 Finally, Dr. Gilmartin actually performed the shuntogram and surgery
the following day.255
Unlike previous cases in which courts have found informal consults, Dr.
Gilmartin committed to further involvement in Irvin’s case, retained control
over Irvin’s course of treatment, offered his medical opinion and services, and
had superior knowledge as a child neurologist. Additionally, Dr. Smith was
not free to accept or reject Dr. Gilmartin’s recommendations because the two
agreed to jointly formulate a plan to evaluate Irvin, and Dr. Gilmartin agreed to
take full responsibility for performing the shuntogram. Additionally, Dr.
Smith was not making a mere inquiry to a colleague, but asking Dr. Gilmartin
if he would join him in diagnosing and treating Irvin. Therefore, Dr.
Gilmartin’s involvement in this case was more than informal. Even if there
was a question of whether this involvement rose to the level of “formal,” this
question should have been left for the jury to decide.
The Kansas Supreme court has limited the extension of a physician-patient
relationship to consulting doctors. If other jurisdictions follow the holding in
Irving, plaintiffs will be cut off from many claims that were once avenues for
relief. Hopefully, Kansas and other jurisdictions will limit Irving to its facts,
but the case has still been a setback for plaintiffs in the medical malpractice
field.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Kansas Supreme Court, in Irvin v. Smith, held that
generally a physician-patient relationship is created only where the physician
personally examines the patient. Unlike several state courts in recent years that
have expanded the theories under which a doctor may be held liable, the Irvin
court limited a consulting doctor’s liability. The Irving holding relieves
consulting doctors of liability even though they may have had a large impact
on the treatment, or lack of treatment, the patient received. It remains to be
seen whether other states will adopt the Irvin court’s reasoning and limit
liability only to those doctors who directly examine the patient. But for now,
in Kansas, a plaintiff’s access to medical malpractice claims has been
somewhat restricted.
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